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KSR’S EFFECT ON PATENT LAW 
Stephen G. Kunin & Andrew K. Beverina* † 
Introduction 
The Supreme Court in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. clarified its 
1966 decision in Graham v. John Deere, avoiding the sea change to a syn-
ergy-based standard that many had expected—and perhaps feared. KSR has 
raised the bar set in Graham for seeking patent protection—by providing a 
flexible test for obviousness—while simultaneously making it easier for 
accused infringers to defend themselves. Moreover, KSR will change the 
strategies of both patent prosecutors and litigators.  
Before KSR, the Supreme Court’s last major decision on nonobviousness 
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 was Graham, in which the Court established three 
factual inquiries for use in determining prima facie obviousness: (1) the 
scope and content of the prior art, (2) the differences between the prior art 
and the claims, and (3) the level of skill in the art. This prima facie case 
could be rebutted by objective evidence of non-obviousness, such as com-
mercial success, long-felt but unsolved needs, and failure of others. 
In applying the three Graham factors, the Federal Circuit has used the 
“teaching, suggestion or motivation” (“TSM”) test. A court using this Fed-
eral Circuit standard to determine obviousness would require a showing of 
some teaching, suggestion or motivation to combine the teachings found in 
the prior art references. This standard was designed to avoid finding claims 
obvious based on impermissible hindsight. Many decisions suggested that 
the motivation must come from the prior art itself rather than from the 
knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in the art (“PHOSITA”). Other 
cases, notably several decided after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
KSR, applied a more flexible approach and held that motivation to combine 
the information contained in the prior art can be found implicitly. 
I. The TSM Test Before and After KSR 
The high tech industry, among others, sharply criticized the TSM test. 
First, these critics argued that the Federal Circuit—not the Supreme Court—
created the TSM test and, in doing so, improperly added an additional step 
to the Graham analysis. Second, the critics claimed that even if the TSM test 
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was a justified application of Graham, the Federal Circuit applied the test 
too rigidly, making it difficult to invalidate bad patents and thereby stifling 
innovation. The pharmaceutical industry, on the other hand, supported the 
TSM test as a way to protect chemical patents against impermissible hind-
sight analysis, since chemical inventions may involve only minor structural 
differences over the prior art and yet still produce unexpected results.  
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in KSR—by way of a 
unanimous non-precedential opinion—many observers predicted the Su-
preme Court would take the opportunity to reverse the Federal Circuit and 
overhaul nonobviousness law, in part by scrapping the TSM test. This pre-
diction seemed prescient when, at oral argument, Justices described the 
TSM test as “gobbledygook” (perhaps a first in Supreme Court jurispru-
dence) and as “worse than meaningless.”  
In KSR, the Court found four errors in the Federal Circuit’s nonobvious-
ness jurisprudence: 
1. The TSM test, while a helpful tool and not necessarily inconsistent with
Graham, was applied too rigidly by the Federal Circuit, which looked
only at the problem the patentee sought to solve;
2. The Federal Circuit wrongly assumed that a PHOSITA would consider
only pieces of prior art designed to solve the same problem identified
by the inventors;
3. The Federal Circuit erroneously held that a claim cannot be obvious
merely because it would be “obvious to try.” Where there is a design
need or market pressure to solve a problem and only a “finite number of
identified predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good rea-
son to pursue the known options”; and
4. The rigid application of TSM “den[ied] factfinders recourse to common
sense.”
The “common sense” of a PHOSITA will now be sufficient to support a 
finding of motivation and courts must consider whether a claimed invention 
is “more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their 
established functions.”  
Although the Court broadened the scope of the obviousness inquiry, it 
did not reject the spirit behind the TSM test. There still must be an “articu-
lated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal 
conclusion” of obviousness. The KSR Court understood that the TSM test 
sought to accomplish a worthy goal. The problem with Graham was that it 
did not provide courts guidance on how to articulate coherently the reason 
why the factual findings in the first three prongs would prompt a PHOSITA 
to make the claimed invention without resort to impermissible hindsight. 
The “articulated reasoning” approach provides a consistent, objective analy-
sis framework. Determining if there is an articulated reason requires 
analysis of a number of factors, pro and con, such as teaching away, reason-
able expectation of success, whether the results are simply from routine 
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experimentation, etc. These factors fill in the gaps of the Graham test and 
also guard against hindsight bias. 
II. Post-KSR Decisions
The Federal Circuit issued a number of decisions while KSR was being 
considered and after its release. These were a mix of chemical and electri-
cal/mechanical cases, the reasoning of which hints at how the Federal 
Circuit will apply KSR. 
The first “combination” case decided post-KSR was Leapfrog Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc. Relying on the new standard, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed a finding of obviousness. The court found that a PHOSITA 
exercising common sense would have added a limitation that was missing 
from the two prior art references in order to achieve the goal of the patent. 
Under KSR, combining old elements according to their established functions 
is obvious, and thus the patent was invalid despite evidence of substantial 
commercial success. 
The Federal Circuit’s treatment of chemical and pharmaceutical patents 
illustrates the difficulties surrounding the TSM test. In Takeda Chemical 
Industries, Inc. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., decided after KSR, the Federal Cir-
cuit rejected an “obvious to try” argument. Alphapharm argued that 
selecting “compound b” and altering it to arrive at the claimed invention 
were obvious steps. Takeda showed that compound b was one of hundreds 
of millions of compounds disclosed in the art and that references taught 
away from its use. The Federal Circuit held that, in chemical cases, it re-
mains necessary to identify some reason why a chemist would “modify a 
known compound in a particular manner.” Alphapharm had failed to identify 
such a reason. The court also noted that, even if Alphapharm had succeeded 
in its prima facie case, secondary considerations would have rebutted their 
showing. These considerations included the district court’s finding that noth-
ing in the prior art “suggest[ed] making the specific molecular modifications 
to compound b that are necessary to achieve the claimed compounds.” 
This decision appeared to retreat from the earlier, heavily criticized re-
sult in Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc. There the Federal Circuit, pre-KSR, had 
reversed the district court and invalidated a patent, holding that substituting 
different forms of salt was the result of routine experimentation and thus 
obvious to try. The Federal Circuit rejected the district court’s findings that 
results of the substitution were unexpected and that there was no reasonable 
expectation of success. As in Leapfrog, commercial success could not save 
the patent. Hopes that Pfizer would be quietly retired in favor of Takeda 
were dashed, however, when the court denied a petition to rehear Pfizer en 
banc (albeit with three judges dissenting). Pfizer’s continued vitality was 
demonstrated yet again when the court cited Pfizer in Pharmastem Thera-
peutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc. But while Pfizer remains good law, it is not 
necessarily inconsistent with KSR. The criticism of Pfizer is that it misap-
plies—not that it ignores—the reasonable expectation of success doctrine, 
which is always a consideration in “obvious to try” challenges. 
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III. Lessons for Prosecution
KSR’s gloss on the TSM test has already influenced patent prosecution, 
the administrative process of obtaining a patent from the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (“PTO”). The PTO has drafted guidelines stating that the 
Graham factors still provide the basis for evaluating obviousness and that 
examiners must articulate a reason for an obviousness determination. The 
PTO has trained its examiners on these guidelines, which will be published 
in the Federal Register. The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences 
(“BPAI”) has issued a series of decisions that may serve as a template for 
examiners. The BPAI decisions emphasize KSR’s instruction that combina-
tions must be more than the “predictable use of prior art elements according 
to their established functions” and that the obviousness analysis can “take 
account of the inferences and creative steps” of a PHOSITA rather than rely-
ing on “precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the 
challenged claim.” 
These guidelines and decisions indicate that applicants now must show 
why the steps taken by the applicant were not readily apparent. Reciting 
unexpected or superior results, functions or properties in the specification 
can show the examiner that the invention goes beyond a combination of 
known elements yielding predictable results. The guidelines and decisions 
also suggest applicants should avoid characterizing the field of the invention 
and avoid identifying problems recognized in the art to be solved in patent 
applications. An adverse party can use such statements against the patentee 
during litigation. Likewise, the patent application should avoid a detailed 
discussion of the prior art if possible, lest a court later seize upon it as evi-
dence of a high level of skill in the art. 
IV. Lessons for Litigation
It will be some time before recognizable post-KSR trends emerge from 
the Federal Circuit’s obviousness opinions. But KSR and post-KSR Federal 
Circuit decisions do provide some early guidance. A party challenging the 
validity of a patent should argue that the invention is merely an art-
recognized solution to an art-recognized problem. The precise tactics for 
this strategy will vary according to the field of the invention, the quality of 
the prior art, and other factors. Meanwhile, a few general approaches to at-
tacking patents are also clear:  
• Establish a high level of skill in the art. The higher the level, the more
technical the line of reasoning on which the claim can rely and the
higher the threshold will be for the PHOSITA’s “common sense;”
• Argue that the prior art had the same “goal” as the patent-in-suit;
• Argue that the invention is merely the optimization of a variable as a re-
sult of routine experimentation;
• Identify known reasons for improvement in the industry and argue that
it would have been obvious to substitute an element in the prior art with
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another to achieve desired results—making it cheaper, stronger, etc.; 
and 
• Argue that the invention would have been “obvious to try” because only
a finite number of identified, predictable ways exist by which to achieve
the goal of the patent.
On the other hand, patentees will face some new challenges in fighting 
off an obviousness attack. For the next several years, most patent litigations 
will involve patents that were prosecuted before KSR and, therefore, might 
contain statements about the field of the invention and detailed discussions 
of the prior art. But the inclusion of these statements will not necessarily be 
fatal. To defend against obviousness, patentees can employ the following 
approaches: 
• Argue that the prior art is non-analogous. For art to be analogous, it
must be in the field of the applicant’s endeavor or reasonably pertinent
to the problem to be solved. Although KSR broadened the second prong
of this analysis, it did not eliminate the analogousness requirement;
therefore, a patentee should argue that the art taken from outside the
same field of endeavor of the patent relates to solving a different prob-
lem than the patent-in-suit solved;
• Argue hindsight or a failure to articulate a reason for the combination
or both. Hindsight based on statements in the patent or patent applica-
tion cannot be the reason for combining references—the patent cannot
be used as a road map for creating hindsight obviousness;
• Argue that the results or the properties of the patent are either unex-
pected or superior so as to avoid the “combination of old elements”
trap;
• Demonstrate how the prior art teaches away from the claimed inven-
tion; and
• Rely on secondary considerations, while recognizing that the Federal
Circuit’s post-KSR decisions have given mixed weight to them.
Conclusion 
The early crop of cases post-KSR seem to show that demonstrating a 
reasonable expectation of success when combining the information con-
tained in the prior art is the key to establishing whether an apparent reason 
with rational underpinnings exists. A patent that combines known elements 
by known methods and that yields predictable results has every expectation 
of successfully being patented, but such a formulaic patent is vulnerable to 
attack. The truly inventive patents—where there was not a reasonable expec-
tation of success and they have unexpected results or properties—will 
survive under KSR. 
